

But, as each pirate is eager to throw the others overboard, E would prefer to kill B, to get the same amount of gold from C.) (In the previous round, one might consider proposing B:99, C:0, D:0, E:1, as E knows it won't be possible to get more coins, if any, if E throws B overboard.


If B, C, D and E remain, B can offer 1 to D because B has the casting vote, only D's vote is required. Therefore, when only three are left the allocation is C:99, D:0, E:1. If there are three left (C, D and E), C knows that D will offer E 0 in the next round therefore, C has to offer E one coin in this round to win E's vote. Since D is senior to E, they have the casting vote so, D would propose to keep 100 for themself and 0 for E. The final possible scenario would have all the pirates except D and E thrown overboard. This becomes apparent if we work backwards. In addition, the order of seniority is known in advance so each of them can accurately predict how the others might vote in any scenario. When each of the pirates votes, they will not just be thinking about the current proposal, but also other outcomes down the line. However, this is far from the theoretical result. To increase the chance of their plan being accepted, one might expect that Pirate A will have to offer the other pirates most of the gold. And finally, the pirates do not trust each other, and will neither make nor honor any promises between pirates apart from a proposed distribution plan that gives a whole number of gold coins to each pirate. Third, each pirate would prefer to throw another overboard, if all other results would otherwise be equal. Second, given survival, each pirate wants to maximize the number of gold coins he receives. First of all, each pirate wants to survive. Pirates base their decisions on four factors. The process repeats until a plan is accepted or if there is one pirate left. If the majority rejects the plan, the proposer is thrown overboard from the pirate ship and dies, and the next most senior pirate makes a new proposal to begin the system again. In case of a tie vote, the proposer has the casting vote. If the majority accepts the plan, the coins are dispersed and the game ends. The pirates, including the proposer, then vote on whether to accept this distribution. The pirate world's rules of distribution say that the most senior pirate first proposes a plan of distribution.

There are five rational pirates (in strict order of seniority A, B, C, D and E) who found 100 gold coins.
